

BATKIVSHCHYNA'S OLD GUARD REBELS AGAINST
YATSENIUK AND PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF THE
GOVERNMENT

WHY PHILANTHROPY IS NOT POPULAR
IN UKRAINE


OLIVER BULLOUGH ON THE LAST MAN
IN RUSSIA AND THE STRUGGLE TO
SAVE THE DYING NATION

international edition

The Ukrainian Week

№ 11 (53) JUNE 2013

IDENTITY MYTHS OF UKRAINE'S EAST



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
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


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Journalists disclose enemies of the press. The top three are Mykola Azarov, Viktor Yanukovych and Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko



Two more crossovers, MPs Viacheslav Kutovy and Volodymyr Kupchak, leave Batkivshchyna



The opposition blocks the VR, demanding that the President delivers his annual report to parliament in person

Yulia's Move

Last week, Yulia Tymoshenko released her latest open letter, which contradicted her unity-oriented rhetoric, causing many to wonder whether the ex-premier had actually written it. During Tymoshenko's incarceration, her interviews have occasionally appeared in the press, and the party press-service has circulated statements and commentaries on current events. But it has long not been a secret that most of these texts were written at the Batkivshchyna headquarters under the control of its top leadership. As for the last letter, which has caused so much controversy, sources within the party confirm that it is an authentic appeal, although complete conviction is only possible when one receives it from her own hands.

Tymoshenko's call to put an end to the provocation of opposition between the government and the opposition along the "fascist" – "anti-fascist" line and even suspend the Rise Ukraine! campaign for this. Instead, she is proposing "to sit at a round table" with the government in order to determine a plan of action regarding European integration. However,



the most telling is the proposal to reject a single candidate in the first round of the election, in order to avoid a struggle among the current opposition threesome for the right to be such a candidate.

Not only opposition supporters, but also numerous party members of the lower, middle and higher echelons of the opposition forces felt that the announcement of such candidate should be a culmination of an entire Rise Ukraine!, and after some time, criticized the resolution approved on May 18 in Kyiv, which

did not actually include such decision. Having spoken with some influential people from Batkivshchyna, *The Ukrainian Week* received explanations regarding one of the possible motivations behind Yulia Tymoshenko's addresses. Arguably she thus demonstrated that she does not merely want to be a repressed symbol of the opposition, but still has her eye on the status of a real political player that it is too soon to write off. The Rise Ukraine! campaign quickly transformed into a travelling promotion plat-

The month in history

7 June 1848



Paul Gauguin, French painter and a founder of Impressionism, is born

12 June 1918



The Bolshevik government signs a preliminary peace treaty with the Ukrainian State headed by Pavlo Skoropadsky

14 June 1941



The mass Soviet deportation of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to Siberia begins. The Baltic States commemorate the victims of communist repressions on this day



The National Football Team wins the match against Montenegro 4:0, thus retaining the chance to play in the 2014 World Cup



The NBU issues a regulation to limit daily settlements in cash to UAH 150,000 from September 1, 2013



The Kyiv District Court rules that the VR Speaker should strip Pavlo Baloha and Oleksandr Dombrovskiy of their MP IDs and voting cards. Both were FPTP candidates whose victory in the 2012 election was appealed in court

form for the opposition leaders, who are competing amongst themselves, while slogans for the release of political prisoners and her in particular during these “insurgent actions” ring ever more quietly.

“Yatseniuk is playing for the long-term, which will not end in 2015,” says a well-known member of the opposition who is not the fan of Arseniy Yatseniuk. “Having obtained Batkivshchyna, he will be able to successfully capitalize on this asset in the forthcoming presidential election and strengthen his starting position in the new political cycle.” Tymoshenko possibly considered this scenario, and there is no way that she would be in favour of it. She is not yet ready to declare this openly, so she is coming up with other arguments in favour of a three-pronged attack: a single opposition candidate can only be determined by the electorate with their votes; it is necessary to avoid a repeat of the Kaniv Four (an alliance of presidential candidates in the 1999 presidential election that collapsed eventually); the teams of opposition nominees will be more motivated to work if each works for its own candidate. This is what she or those using her name in this situation think as regards opposition to Arseniy Yatseniuk, which has become more intense in light of his hypothetical entry to Batkivshchyna and his position in its leadership.

In other words, if one assumes that the letter was indeed written personally by Tymoshenko or with her knowledge, this would be evidence that she is seriously concerned with her own political prospects in the new re-

ality, which is forming in Ukrainian politics. She still sees herself as the only agreed nominee with a real chance of defeating Yanukovich, and to achieve this, she expects to be released from prison and have her conviction overturned in the short term. According to this logic, it would be wise for Yulia Tymoshenko to maintain her vagueness on the issue of the nomination of a single opposition candidate for as long as possible, otherwise she will lose her own chance.

However, if the letter was not written by Tymoshenko, then several scenarios are possible. First – the group in Batkivshchyna that is involved in this is trying to use the ex-premier as heavy artillery and last hope in the battle for influence in the party, which they are losing at an alarming rate under the Yatseniuk – Martynenko pressure. The second option – Batkivshchyna is trying to gracefully withdraw from the long-drawn and overall ineffective Rise Ukraine! campaign, and also avoid the nomination of a single candidate, since in light of the latest polls, this could be the leader of UDAR. Or the government is exploiting Yulia Tymoshenko and/or her close circle, (after all, her isolation has escalated of late), which could have persuaded her/them, that “a war with us will not resolve anything, other than offer dividends to others, but cooperation will win her freedom”. So letters with a content that is beneficial to the Presidential Administration in the name of the imprisoned revolutionary could continue to appear. Subsequent messages signed by Tymoshenko should clarify this situation. ■

A No-Win Situation for Ukraine

The signing of the Memorandum on closer cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Commission by Mykola Azarov on behalf of Ukraine in Minsk, signals that for the second time since the Kharkiv deals, Moscow is foisting Ukraine with a game it cannot win. According to this document, instead of the previously announced “opportunities to defend national interests” it gained generally unfavourable obligations. More specifically, clause 3 indicates that “Ukraine declares its intent to comply with the principles ... of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, refrain from actions and declarations directed against the interests of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space”. Obviously, the Kremlin can use this as an argument against European integration. Meanwhile, the final version of the Memorandum turned out to be much less favourable in the part that Ukraine insisted on. Among other things, the representative of Ukraine will not be able to attend all meetings of the Commission, as was initially the case, only on (and on condition of!) an invitation of Chairman of the Council or the Board and on the agreement of all members of the EEC Council. Moreover, this only pertains to open meetings and “without the right to participate in decision-making”, even on issues that affect the interests of Ukraine. Nor will Kyiv be able to receive the documents and decisions of the EEC, the Commission and its bodies, other than those that contain “information with limited circulation”. In this case, just as with documents of a non-confidential nature, it is generally possible to familiarize oneself with them on the sites of these structures.

So even in such document as this Memorandum, which does not have the formal status of an international treaty, but the norms of which are not mandatory for execution, an unequal approach was demonstrated, which under current conditions, is all that Ukraine can count on in any form of “amicable” relations with Russia. However, the Ukrainian leadership is not coming to any conclusions. To be more specific, VR Speaker Volodymyr Rybak stated that there was no need for Parliament to ratify the Memorandum, since Ukraine does not currently intend to gain Customs Union membership: “We’ll see how the Customs Union operates on the inside and in which matters Ukraine can cooperate with it. We will then make our decision. But it’s currently too soon to talk about this.”

16 June 1903



Henry Ford founds Ford Motor Company where the large-scale manufacture of cars with assembly lines is introduced for the first time



17 June 1953

The Soviet army cracks down on the uprising in East Germany



19 June 1623

Blaise Pascal, French mathematician and the founder of the probability theory and the final law of hydrostatics, is born

Off With His Head!

Regardless of its motivations, the war of Batkivshchyna's old guard against Arseniy Yatseniuk is playing into the hands of the Yanukovych regime

Author:
Andriy
Skumin

As Batkivshchyna's "unifying congress" to fully integrate its United Opposition allies – first and foremost Arseniy Yatseniuk and Mykola Martynenko, who will ostensibly take influential leading positions shortly thereafter – nears, a conflict has escalated within the party. The congress is scheduled to take place on June 15. However, after "Tymoshenko's address", to which opposition leaders barely reacted, and many doubt that it she wrote it, another open address surfaced – this time from Batkivshchyna members reluctant to see Yatseniuk as their leader. Their desperate moves probably signal their weakness in the confrontation

with Yatseniuk's group within the United Opposition, therefore they are using every effort to involve the Tymoshenko factor to disrupt the party's takeover by Yatseniuk and his grey cardinal, Mykola Martynenko.

BAD COMPANY

Yatseniuk is accused of bringing crossovers to parliament under his quota and suspected of cooperation with those in power during the election campaign. The first accusation is not groundless. It is the result of "cooperation" with Mykola Martynenko, whose political nature was known long before the campaign actually kicked off. Yatseniuk's further

prospects in politics will also depend on his ability to draw conclusions about Martynenko. But why did the "old guard" not lament about these threats before the election? It was then that the members of Yatseniuk's Front of Change quota raised many questions among journalists and public activists, while *The Ukrainian Week* drew up a specific list of potential crossovers. The answer is simple: it was the money of these crossovers, used by the United Opposition to finance its election campaign.

Accusations regarding Yatseniuk's cooperation with those in power look strange, given the fact that the group of crossovers is form-



ing right before the Batkivshchyna congress, made up exclusively from Yatseniuk's quota. This confirms the regime's targeted attack to disrupt Yatseniuk's entry into Batkivshchyna and provoke a split within it. Obviously, there are many more potential crossovers in all opposition parties and their groups. According to *The Ukrainian Week's* sources, about ten more opposition MPs are waiting to exit opposition parties or vote in line with the Party of Regions (PR). But those in power are pulling out only those MPs who came to parliament under Yatseniuk's quota at a time when they don't really need extra votes for anything, and shortly before the Batkivshchyna congress.

In addition, a number of Batkivshchyna MPs linked to the anti-Yatseniuk rebellion have recently faced the regime's repressive machine. A case was initiated to strip Yuriy Odarchenko, the leader of Batkivshchyna's Kyiv branch, of his MP mandate, and closed several months later despite the fact that the Prosecutor's Office and courts can fake anything against anyone if necessary. Also unclear is the price of suspended proceedings against a family member of Andriy Kozhemiakin, one of Batkivshchyna's leaders. Serhiy Mishchenko, another ex-BYuT member, also joined the anti-Yatseniuk group and the internal conflict within Batkivshchyna. He promotes the idea of preventing the takeover of Batkivshchyna by Yatseniuk and hints at the possible creation of an alternative party under the Yulia Tymoshenko brand.

...THE ONE-EYED MAN IS KING

As a would-be leader of the opposition, Yatseniuk has many shortcomings. He does not stick to any firm values, has no ideology of the country's transformation, nor is he ready or willing to change it profoundly (obviously, a profound transformation takes more than just the replacement of Yanukovich with Yatseniuk). But who has it all in Batkivshchyna? Indeed, Yatseniuk makes too many mistakes as an opposition politician with an eye on the presidency, while obviously being anything but an independent decision-maker. He often disparages his political allies and ignores his faction. The latest example was when Yatseniuk announced the VR blocking which came as a surprise not only to Svo-

boda or UDAR, but Batkivshchyna as well. For the old guard that built Batkivshchyna, he poses the threat of their removal from running a number of party organizations. Given the letter to Tymoshenko, this is already taking place.

However, confrontation with Yatseniuk under current conditions is just the first step to making Batkivshchyna a complete outsider and the success of the Presidential Administration's scenario to prevent Yatseniuk from running for office as the opposition candidate with ratings that could bring him to the second round. Klitschko could well become the next target in the campaign to squeeze rivals out of the political arena.

The number of Batkivshchyna's regional branches that rebelled against Yatseniuk's and Martynenko's membership in the party as its leaders is as yet unknown, but sources say that they are a minority. Thus, this rebellion is likely to result in their spin-off from Batkivshchyna and Yatseniuk as its leader. As a result, they will most likely end up on the political sidelines or turn into a spoiler political force using the Tymoshenko brand, unless she publicly rejects this, to dilute the votes of the protest-oriented electorate. The real consequences of the spin-off will resemble the cloning of several of Batkivshchyna's local branches in the 2010 election when it lost badly in some regions.

Batkivshchyna has no other leader who is equal to Yatseniuk, nor does it have time to choose and promote a new one. Yulia Tymoshenko may pop up in the political process before 2015, but only if the Presidential Administration decides that this will ultimately destabilize and dilute the opposition before the election. Otherwise, nobody is going to release her. Therefore, the internal struggle in the current Batkivshchyna faction and party will lead to the emergence of an uncontrolled pool of MPs that will join the pro-government majority and the teams of other potential opposition presidential candidates.

Unless it has a real candidate to run in the presidential election, Batkivshchyna will transform into at least three opponent groups that will focus all their efforts on an internecine war rather than on the struggle against Yanukovich. The

In spite of his obvious shortcomings, Batkivshchyna has no other leader who is equal to Yatseniuk, nor does it have time to choose and promote a new one

party itself may well face powerful raider attacks on both a regional and national scale. The government already has relevant experience. Just look at political raider attacks against Batkivshchyna's regional branches supported and controlled by its former sponsor, Bohdan Hubskeyi, in 2010. Moreover, the Justice Ministry headed by Justice Minister Lavrynovych, is the key player in political raids; and the courts do whatever the government instructs them to do. Thus, the groups controlled by the president's puppeteers will be given the green light to change party leaders at their own congresses and amend party charters as the party in power sees fit, to further marginalize Batkivshchyna.

On June 15, Batkivshchyna will have to pass the capacity test or step onto the path of an outsider.

THE CONFRONTATION WITH YATSENIUK UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS IS JUST THE FIRST STEP TO MAKING BATKIVSHCHYNA A COMPLETE OUTSIDER AND THE SUCCESS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION'S SCENARIO TO PREVENT YATSENIUK FROM RUNNING FOR OFFICE

This should encourage both conflicting parties to think about what they are doing, unless they are deliberately playing into the hands of the Presidential Administration. They have to create a common platform through mutual concessions, stop criticizing one another in public, and punish those responsible for lapses in HR and informational policy and open flirting with the government, including the exclusion of political opportunist Mykola Martynenko; reinforce faction and party discipline. Yatseniuk should not allow people who will obviously jump ship to take over Batkivshchyna's local branches, even if they can support them financially, because he will then be held liable for their actions. Finally, Batkivshchyna has to draw up and promote a clear agenda of transformations with which it intends to claim power in the country, and its new leader intends to run for the office of president. ■

The National Res

The background, nature and threats of the Donbas identity

Author:
Ihor Losev

Will Ukraine split into East and West? This is one of the first things that comes to mind with every new election campaign. In fact, regional differences are not so much between East and West as they are between most of Ukraine on one side and Donbas and Crimea on the other. The latter are arguably the most Sovietized Ukrainian territories. However, they have the potential to change, and the latest parliamentary election proved this: the locals are slowly but surely shedding their regional tribal sentiments, servile dependence on their “homeboy” bosses and mafia, and distorted local patriotism, which their steel barons and criminals have been exploiting for years. In this sense, the territory covering Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odesa Oblasts is now a buffer zone of

sorts between pro-European and Soviet Ukraine. Hence, its perpetual ambivalence between the two opposite impulses coming from different sides. Unlike Central and Western Ukraine where the majority votes for pro-Ukrainian forces, and the Donbas where the majority votes for the PR as “homeboys”, other south-eastern oblasts have a more equal divide with around half voting for the PR and the Communist Party – these people feel nostalgic about the USSR and the iron fist, and the other half supporting the opposition – these voters prefer a European Ukraine.

Election results in this internal buffer zone have lately revealed a steady strengthening of pro-Ukrainian and pro-European forces. However, these positive transformations are taking place without the due involvement of the democratic opposition that seems to have given up on this

territory long ago, preferring to win their parliamentary seats in the friendlier Western and Central Ukraine. However, it is this huge area that is now deciding Ukraine’s future.

DONBAS ÜBER ALLES

The current state of Ukraine largely stems from the fact that one territorial clan with its own regional mentality is imposing its own rules and specific values on the entire country, having established tough control over Donbas, i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, over the past 20 years. Thanks to the virtual isolation of their region and cementing of Russian and Soviet practices in it, the “Donetsk elites” have successfully shaped what is known as regional patriotism in these two mining oblasts. In the case of the region’s business and bureaucratic elites, known as the “Donetsk guys” this is clan-oli-

DONBAS SYMBOLS

CLOSED ACCESS:
Monuments in the Donbas are mostly for people born there and their accomplishments. Meanwhile, there is little respect for national icons



serve

garch patriotism that has little to do with the national interests of the state.

There are two scenarios for the evolution of regional patriotism: It can rise to the scale of national values and merge with them as a reinforcing component, or degrade into separatism and tribalism that is manifested in the “homeboy – stranger” approach, among others. If this is the case, the regional elite that takes over central power views other regions and the country overall as a prize, an occupied territory where it should set a new order and exploit its resources to the benefit of its clan. “We conquered Russia, now we must learn to govern it,” Vladimir Lenin once said. The Donetsk elites have been learning the art of governing Ukraine for four years now. In fact, they have merely been implementing governance practices tested in the

Donbas throughout Ukraine. Notably, Boris Kolesnikov, the then Infrastructure Minister, made virtually all Ukrainian-speaking top officials in Lviv Oblast speak to him in Russian during Euro 2012 preparations, despite the PR’s rhetoric of respect for every region.

Unfortunately, Donetsk’s regional patriotism has been following the second scenario, opposing the rest of Ukraine and fueling confrontation whenever possible. In Soviet times, the Donbas didn’t really stand out from the many other industrial regions of the USSR, enjoying the widespread communist image of being the “industrial heart of Ukraine, of the miners as the “Guards of the working class”, of the “hardworking Donbas” and the like. Soviet mentality monopolized the region. After Ukraine declared independence, the Donbas elites, mostly technocratic and Moscow-oriented red directors tumbling into criminal practices, felt that they had to exploit these old myths for political purposes as they competed for control over the country’s centre with other regional elites. Their key rivals were the Dnipropetrovsk groups who had a better understanding of the national context compared to their Donetsk opponents. The Donetsk

elite with its vague “credit history” found it much more challenging to gain a legitimate place in the centre because this required a certain public identification with the Ukrainian language, culture, history and identity at that point. Unlike the Dnipropetrovsk region with its Cossack background and abundant history, the Donbas had much less of a cultural background. As a result, local Soviet

THANKS TO THE VIRTUAL ISOLATION AND CEMENTING OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE DONBAS, ITS ELITES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY SHAPED AN EXOTIC FORM OF REGIONAL PATRIOTISM

“values” successfully filled the ideological vacuum.

A Donbas-born journalist once wrote: “A good friend of mine who lives in Donetsk, shared her sociological observations: ‘Chernivtsi is a parasitic city! Ternopil is also a parasitic city! And Ivano-Frankivsk as well!’ Other parasitic cities included Cherkasy and Chernihiv, while the main parasite – Kyiv, of course. ‘We mine coal and smelt



metal here, and what about you?’ she explained.” The woman never worked at a mine or a steel plant. Since she got her university degree, she has worked in an office, with a computer. Just like hundreds of thousands of people in Kyiv, Cherkasy and Ivano-Frankivsk.”

This is a classic manifest of the Donbas regional patriotism: we are the workers, while the rest are sluggards and parasites, feeding off the “hardworking Donbas”. Meanwhile, the locals are often unaware – or prefer to be so – of that fact that the obsolete and unreformed Donbas industry is a huge burden on Ukraine. A comparison of the taxes the Donbas pays to the central budget and official transfers to Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts from the central budget, indirect transfers through the Pension Fund and subsidies to coal mining companies there shows that their taxes (UAH 21bn) do not cover even 50% of the funding later allocated to them (over UAH 44bn). Moreover, without state subsidies, for instance, the extraction of Donetsk coal would be so expensive that the metal it is used to smelt would be uncompetitive on global markets – and this is the core business of many oligarchs.

However, nobody is about to tell them that. This has been the core ideology around which the Donbas community has been carefully consolidated for the past 20 years, while Kyiv preferred to stay out. This feeds the concept of separation into homeboys and strangers. “We and you are common in essence,” said Oleksandr Yefremov, Head of the PR parliamentary faction, during the 2012 parliamentary campaign addressing to the Donbas voters. This essence has been shaped by the decades of Soviet industrialization, resettlement, and 20 years of the region’s isolated existence after independence. The informational ghetto the Donbas has been in all this time prevented the locals from hearing any alternative information, made it easier to brainwash them, and nurtured their particular worldview. Rebels were made very clear – with violence at times – that “this is not Ukraine”. The environment



Donetsk is the only city outside of Russia that accepted the Tsar Cannon, “a symbol of Russian power”, as a gift from the Moscow government

shaped intolerance to alternative ideas or any criticism of the region. Now, the local rules, including feudalism, tribalism, opportunism and greed, are spreading far beyond the region. Many Ukrainians cede to this. One signal is the growing number of those willing to make careers in “profitable” public sectors. More and more young people apply to the Tax Academy even though tax services are among the most corrupt authorities in Ukraine. However, many

ing for the opposition compared to Western and Central Ukraine. The Donbas and Crimea are the most difficult. However, they have good social and national potential, which the opposition has so far been surrendering to its opponents without even trying to really struggle for them or offering South-Eastern Ukraine an ideological alternative.

Pro-European forces still have a door of opportunity in that part of Ukraine. But it may not stay open for much longer. Their opponents are not exactly sitting idle. Very soon, the growing poverty – the inevitable result of the PR’s economic policy may radicalize sentiments in this region. People there will need new attractive slogans, fresh and untainted political leaders, and reasonable agendas to overcome the current crisis. This is a unique chance that may define Ukraine’s direction for decades to come. Meanwhile, if regional patriotism – in the Donbas, Halychyna, Kyiv or anywhere else – mounts and overshadows the pan-Ukrainian patriotism oriented at the state development, it may put Ukraine on a bloody path of Yugoslavia of the early 1990s. ■



THERE ARE TWO SCENARIOS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL PATRIOTISM: IT CAN MERGE WITH NATIONAL VALUES OR DEGRADE INTO SEPARATISM

Ukrainians find it easier to live that way, and some see no sense in resistance.

THE DOOR OF OPPORTUNITY

Working in South-Eastern Ukraine is much more challeng-

Ignored Potential

As discontent with the current regime mounts in South-Eastern Ukraine, its electorate will seek alternative forces to support. The opposition would be wise to take advantage of the opportunity before the upcoming presidential election

The government's efforts to trigger political confrontation with "anti-fascist" slogans signal its desperate search for ideas that could consolidate the electorate before the upcoming presidential election after it failed to fulfill its latest improvement promises. Disappointed with their choice, its one-time voters mostly vote with their feet and join the disenchanted category. Most voters ignored the latest local elections on June 2. This trend was already noted in the 2012 parliamentary election, and seems to be continuing. Just 22.3% of all voters cast their ballots in the early mayoral election in Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast, on June 2. The PR candidate won with barely half of the votes cast, i.e. nearly 12% of all voters registered in the lists. The turnout in Donbas was almost half that of local elections in other regions on that day.

The scale of voter discontent with the current situation in South-Eastern Ukraine is increasing. If they do not switch to the opposition, they could end up under the influence of anti-Ukrainian projects, often supported by Russia. The advocates of separatist initiatives in South-Eastern Ukraine often claim that this region has never been Ukrainian. However, they say this after 200 and 70 years respectively of severe Russification under the Russian Empire and Sovietization under the USSR. This included the 1932-33 Famine that hit the region very hard, oppression during Stalin's collectivization and industrialization, and the mass resettlement of ethnic Russians to the region. Today, it has the highest concentration of economic assets in the hands of a few major players, mostly oligarchs, who have a monopoly over the fi-

nancially-dependent population and are following the Soviet-Russian model. Still, every election over the past decade shows that more and more of the local voters are gravitating towards Ukrainian identity and the European choice. Soviet-oriented pro-Russian parties are exhausting their electoral potential here. In September 2007, for instance, BYuT (The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko), Nasha Ukrayina-Narodna Samooborona (Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence) and Svoboda collectively won 45.6% of the vote in Ukraine. In October 2012, Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda ended up with over 50%. In the years between 2007 and 2012, their rating grew thanks to the south-eastern electorate. In 2012, 38% voted for the opposition in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast compared to 32% in 2004, and 33% against 26% in 2004 in Kharkiv Oblast.

Similar trends were seen in Odesa, Mykolayiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, while Kherson Oblast supported the opposition with 40% in 2012. Support even increased in Donetsk and Luhans Oblasts. In 2004, 4% and 6% voted for the opposition candidate in the presidential election respectively. In 2012, over 11% supported opposition parties in Donetsk Oblast, and over 12% in Luhansk Oblast. This is not the limit.

Meanwhile, there is the impression that the opposition is unwilling or unable to offer south-easterners a clear and persuasive alternative to the Yanukovich regime in order to win their support. The Rise Ukraine! rally in Donetsk confirmed this. The protesters were mostly activists of the three opposition parties from several eastern oblasts, many of them from Kyiv and

PHOTO: UNIAN



The RISE UKRAINE! rally in Donetsk involved mostly activists from the three opposition parties and did not tell the local voters anything new. This is not the comprehensible and attractive alternative that could bring the opposition new supporters in South-Eastern Ukraine

other regions. With only 2,000-3,000 protesters in a city of about a million people, the rally was sluggish and looked like something set up to just tick the box or create some media buzz. The speakers once again repeated the usual list of trivial statements. It looked as if they did not expect to have any effect or impact on the protesters. This once again brought up the long-standing problem of Ukrainian “democratic forces”, which failed to pay due attention to South-Eastern Ukraine, especially the Donbas throughout all the years of independence, viewing it as the domain of the Donetsk guys and a hopeless battle for the electorate. As a result, the East remains essentially segregated from the rest of the country.

Donetsk “elites” have been running the region for decades on end, with barely any subordination to Kyiv. Over this period, a special Russian-Soviet model of administration has evolved in the Donbas. When the PR came to power, it rapidly expanded all over Ukraine. The factors discouraging the opposition from proactive efforts in this region include the “price” of one vote which is two to four times higher in South-Eastern Ukraine compared to, say, Central Ukraine; the lack of due control over local branches by opposition headquarters, making their local functionaries inert and obedient to local authorities; and a high risk of defeat in first-past-the-post parliamentary and local elections that discourages potentially strong and respected candidates from running as representatives of the opposition in this region. There are solutions to each of these problems, provided that democratic forces actually have the will to try and change the country.

IN THE REAR OF THE REGIME

Disenchanted with their “home-boy” government, voters in the south-east deserve closer attention from the opposition for a number of reasons. Firstly, their support may well offset the impact of election rigging. Secondly, it will help the opposition to expand its local platform and use local activists as its observers and election commission members rather than

activists brought in from Western and Central Ukraine, which only contributes to the opposition’s image of strangers in the region. Thirdly, the expansion of the opposition’s branches is important, should falsifications trigger protests. Fourthly, the regional divide must be eliminated in order to unite society in a potential confrontation with the regime.

In order to make the most of the potential in south-eastern regions, the opposition has to put more effort into expanding a local platform it can rely on in the upcoming presidential or parliamentary election, whether regular or early, or create it from scratch in some regions. It should pay special attention to urban South-Eastern Ukraine, since the share of urban population in the Donbas is 90%, with 70-80% in other parts of the region. It should put more thought into alternative solutions for the socio-economic problems of the south-eastern urban population, such as unemployment, the closure of mines, stifling of SMEs, distribution of local budgets, environmental issues and the like. The

a comprehensible alternative for their region and to explain why they live in misery and how they can escape the vicious circle.

South-Eastern Ukraine is one of the regions most affected by the oligarchic monopoly. It desperately needs to shed its proletarian legacy and grow a powerful class of wealthy entrepreneurs and liberal professionals, capable of choosing their own position rather than a submissive mass for the administration of public enterprise and entities or oligarchic owners. The opposition has to communicate to people that the social stereotypes imposed in the Soviet past, including the icon of a worker that the state will take care of and collectivism distorted into a herd mentality, leave them with no options other than degeneration and poverty, because they stifle initiative and entrepreneurial skills, which are the key elements of any development. South-Eastern Ukraine, especially the Donbas, is riddled with obsolete enterprises and an economy that have no prospects in their current state. Replacing them with new promising ones that will quickly generate new jobs and income is impossible with current oligarchic monopolies or state-owned enterprises. Private ownership and numerous initiatives that offer a lot of new jobs are the only options that will lead to change. This requires the protection of private ownership and an effective anti-monopoly policy on the part of the government and large-scale lending to promote private business. Meanwhile, it should be explained to the south-easterners who stick to their proletarian Soviet legacy, that the state will never make them wealthier. Its role is not paternalism and the feeding of destructive illusions, but the support and creation of an environment where every citizen can make a prosperous life for himself.

Another important aspect of the struggle for South-Eastern Ukraine is to help its citizens overcome their Soviet stereotypes on language, history, relations between Ukraine and Russia, and Ukraine’s geopolitical and civilization choice that are still fueled by local pro-Russian and the Russian mass media. Double standards, whereby the opposition offers one interpretation of its



SOUTH-EASTERN UKRAINE IS ONE OF THE REGIONS MOST AFFECTED BY THE OLIGARCHIC MONOPOLY. IT DESPERATELY NEEDS TO SHED ITS PROLETARIAN LEGACY AND GROW A POWERFUL CLASS OF WEALTHY ENTREPRENEURS AND LIBERAL PROFESSIONALS, CAPABLE OF CHOOSING THEIR OWN POSITION

opposition is also very passive in rural parts of the region where administrative leverage has much more impact than in big cities. As a result, predominantly Ukrainian-speaking rural regions gave the PR and the Communist Party more support than did most oblast centres and big cities.

A WAKE-UP CALL FOR THE EAST

The crucial task for the opposition is to offer the disillusioned voters in South-Eastern Ukraine

2015 platform

The opposition had the opportunity to win in nearly 150 of 225 FPTP districts in the 2012 parliamentary election, because it beat the PR in party-list voting in all of these districts. If Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda had agreed properly on common candidates and strategy, they would have won a majority in parliament.



The opposition's FPTP candidates had great potential to win in South-Eastern Ukraine, given their good results in many of these districts (see below), although it is commonly considered to be the PR's core region. According to our estimates, opposition candidates could have won in at least 28 FPTP districts in South-Eastern Ukraine if the three opposition parties had nominated common candidates and conducted a more effective election campaign

stance on the language issue and history in the west and the centre, and another in the south-east, are unacceptable. It should stick to a consistent and reasonable position, carefully choosing solid arguments and communicating them to the voters.


Changing stereotypes is difficult but possible. For instance, many south-easterners support the idea of Ukraine joining the Customs Union with Russia. However, most industries in these regions, especially coal mining and steelworks, have strong competitors in Russia. Therefore, they have much better prospects outside the Customs Union. However, since the issue of Ukraine's membership has been raised yet again, the opposition has failed to explain to Donbas voters why Customs Union membership poses a threat to their coal industry. First and foremost, it should address the younger generation and the middle-aged.

A comparison of 2007 and 2012 election results has revealed a partial shift of generations over these five years, which is the key driver of political change in Ukraine. A new generation of voters born in Ukraine is replacing the old generation of homo sovieticus that bears the inferiority complex of the past. According to exit polls, 40.1% of those who voted for the Communist Party were over 60. Almost 30% of PR voters are over 60 years old. The opposition's share of voters of this age is 24.7-27.2% for Svoboda and Batkivshchyna and up to 12.7% for UDAR. The generation shift is accompanied by the intellectual growth of voters. 30.9-33.6% of PR and Communist Party voters have incomplete or completed college degrees, compared to 39.6%, 46.9% and 54.2% respectively for Svoboda, Batkivshchyna and UDAR.


Communication with south-eastern voters will not bring an overnight result, especially with the existing obstacles of administrative leverage and deep-rooted Soviet and Russian stereotypes. However, the opposition still has a chance to create a solid electoral platform in South-Eastern Ukraine to remove the current regime of the Family and oligarchs and initiate the transformations that the region so desperately needs. ■



Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
The opposition won 12 of 17 districts in party-list voting




Zaporizhzhia Oblast
The opposition won 3 of 9 districts in party-list voting




Mykolayiv Oblast


The opposition won one of 6 districts in party-list voting but the victory was essentially stolen from its candidate, Arkadiy Kornatskyi. The district is waiting for a re-election




Kharkiv Oblast
The opposition won 4 of 14 districts in party-list voting




Odesa Oblast
The opposition won 3 of 11 districts in party-list voting



Kherson Oblast
The opposition won 4 of 5 districts in party-list voting



Towards the end of poverty



In his inaugural address in 1949 Harry Truman said that “more than half the people in the world are living in conditions approaching misery. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of those people.” It has taken much longer than Truman hoped, but the world has lately been making extraordinary progress in lifting people out of extreme poverty. Between 1990 and 2010, their number fell by half as a share of the total population in developing countries, from 43% to 21%—a reduction of almost 1 billion people.

Now the world has a serious chance to redeem Truman’s pledge to lift the least fortunate. Of the 7 billion people alive on the planet, 1.1 billion subsist below the internationally accepted extreme-poverty line of USD1.25 a day. Starting this week and

continuing over the next year or so, the UN’s usual Who’s Who of politicians and officials from governments and international agencies will meet to draw up a new list of targets to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were set in September 2000 and expire in 2015. Governments should adopt as their main new goal the aim of reducing by another billion the number of people in extreme poverty by 2030.

TAKE A BOW, CAPITALISM

Nobody in the developed world comes remotely close to the poverty level that USD1.25 a day represents. America’s poverty line is USD63 a day for a family of four. In the richer parts of the emerging world USD4 a day is the poverty barrier. But poverty’s scourge is fiercest below USD1.25 (the average of the 15 poorest countries’ own poverty

lines, measured in 2005 dollars and adjusted for differences in purchasing power): people below that level live lives that are poor, nasty, brutish and short. They lack not just education, health care, proper clothing and

MOST OF THE CREDIT, MUST GO TO CAPITALISM AND FREE TRADE, FOR THEY ENABLE ECONOMIES TO GROW

shelter—which most people in most of the world take for granted—but even enough food for physical and mental health. Raising people above that level of wretchedness is not a sufficient ambition for a prosperous planet, but it is a necessary one.

The world’s achievement in the field of poverty reduction is, by almost any measure, impressive. Although many of the origi-


nal MDGs—such as cutting maternal mortality by three-quarters and child mortality by two-thirds—will not be met, the aim of halving global poverty between 1990 and 2015 was achieved five years early.

The MDGs may have helped marginally, by creating a yardstick for measuring progress, and by focusing minds on the evil of poverty. Most of the credit, however, must go to capitalism and free trade, for they enable economies to grow—and it was growth, principally, that has eased destitution.

Poverty rates started to collapse towards the end of the 20th century largely because developing-country growth accelerated, from an average annual rate of 4.3% in 1960-2000 to 6% in 2000-10. Around two-thirds of poverty reduction within a country comes from growth. Greater equality also helps, contributing the other third. A 1% increase in incomes in the most unequal countries produces a mere 0.6% reduction in poverty; in the most equal countries, it yields a 4.3% cut.

China (which has never shown any interest in MDGs) is responsible for three-quarters of the achievement. Its economy has been growing so fast that, even though inequality is rising fast, extreme poverty is disappearing. China pulled 680m people out of misery in 1981-2010, and reduced its extreme-poverty rate from 84% in 1980 to 10% now.

That is one reason why (as the briefing explains) it will be harder to take a billion more people out of extreme poverty in the next 20 years than it was to take almost a billion out in the past 20. Poorer governance in India and Africa, the next two targets, means that China's experience is unlikely to be swiftly replicated there. Another reason is that the bare achievement of pulling people over the USD1.25-a-day line has been relatively easy in the past few years because so many people were just below it. When growth makes them even slightly better off, it hauls them over the line. With fewer people just below the official misery limit, it will be more difficult to push large numbers over it.



So caution is justified, but the goal can still be achieved. If developing countries maintain the impressive growth they have managed since 2000; if the poorest countries are not left behind by faster-growing middle-income ones; and if inequality does not widen so that the rich lap up all the cream of growth—then developing countries would cut extreme poverty from 16% of their populations now to 3% by 2030. That would reduce the absolute numbers by 1 billion. If growth is a little faster and income more equal, extreme poverty could fall to just 1.5%—as near to zero as is realistically possible. The number of the destitute would then be about 100m, most of them in intractable countries in Africa. Misery's billions would be consigned to the annals of history.

MARKETS VS MISERY

That is a lot of ifs. But making those things happen is not as difficult as cynics profess. The world now knows how to reduce poverty. A lot of targeted policies—basic social safety nets and cash-transfer schemes, such as Brazil's Bolsa Familia—help. So does binning policies like fuel subsidies to Indonesia's middle class and China's hukou household-registration system (see article) that boost inequality. But the biggest poverty-reduction measure of all is liberalising markets to let poor people get richer. That means freeing trade between countries (Africa is still cruelly punished by tariffs) and within them (China's real great leap forward occurred because it allowed private business to grow). Both India and Africa are crowded with monopolies and restrictive practices.

Many Westerners have reacted to recession by seeking to constrain markets and roll globalisation back in their own countries, and they want to export these ideas to the developing world, too. It does not need such advice. It is doing quite nicely, largely thanks to the same economic principles that helped the developed world grow rich and could pull the poorest of the poor out of destitution. ■

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Put in a Good Word for the Poor Oligarchs

Oligarchs continue to imitate business in Ukraine: they redistribute old Soviet industrial assets without creating any new ones and get windfall profits at taxpayers' expense

The Cabinet of Ministers' meeting on June 5 churned out a fresh and hardly the last example of how oligarchs are practicing the parasitism of state budget financing and avoid taxes. It considered a draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Cabinet of Ministers and the mining and steel industry, approving necessary actions to rescue it from crisis. The purpose of the Memorandum is to "create conditions to stabilize the operation of the mining and steel industry, make domestic steel products more competitive, and preserve jobs". For this, the government is supposed to provide mining and steel companies with a wide range of unlimited tax, customs, tariff and railway transportation privileges. Under the draft Memorandum, the Cabinet ensures that rates for the use of mineral resources, land and environmental tax will remain unchanged (this privilege will cost the taxpayers UAH 0.7bn); prevents the increase of railway transportation costs for mining and steel companies by more than 5% of 2012 rates (as a result, Ukrainian Railways will end up with decreased revenues and will fill the gap with more expensive train tickets for passengers); and prevents the increase of electricity prices for mining and steel companies by more than 5% of the April 1, 2013 rate (which means that they will be subsidized at the expense of state-owned nuclear power stations and state-subsidized coal for power plants) for the term of the Memorandum.

The interests of 300,000 workers are used as the government's official explanation for this lobbying of mining and steel companies. In fact, however, this is a blatant attempt to finance the windfall profits of a narrow circle of oligarchs from the meager budget that can barely cover bene-

fits to the most socially vulnerable categories, let alone others. The narrow circle includes Rinat Akhmetov's and Vadym Novynskyi's MetInvest; Ihor Kolomoyskyi's and Hennadiy Boholiubov's Private-Inter-Trading; Viktor Pinchuk's Interpipe; the Industrial Union of Donbas controlled by the Russian Evraz, and the like. The draft Memorandum does not specify signatories from the mining and steel industry, which means that this state support could be very selective. Perhaps, only those most loyal to the government will get their piece of the pie.

This support for oligarchs is a telling example of top-level corruption, which is likely to deprive the most vulnerable categories of the population, dependant on billions of hryvnias in public funding and a surge of tax pressure on non-oligarch business that will finance privileges for a handful of oligarchic groups. Similarly, the state is supporting the coal industry. It costs taxpayers over UAH 14bn but brings more and more profits to entities linked to the Family, Rinat Akhmetov's DTEK and smaller coal business owners.

The steel industry is indeed going through hard times. Steel exports and output have been shrinking for two years in a row now. In Q1'2013, exports dropped by 9.2% compared to Q1'2012, while output dropped by 7.8% (14.5% and 4.1% in 2012 compared to 2011 respectively). Officially reported losses amounted to UAH 4.5bn in Q1'2013 and over UAH 15bn in 2012. But the industry crisis is largely caused by the lack of necessary investment into modernization when the markets were on the rise, sending the oligarchs' profits soaring. On civilized markets with real business rules and competition, more effective business owners quickly replace unprofitable and





uncompetitive enterprises. This is not the case in Ukraine, where business really is imitated.

Government support of the mining and steel industry will cause budget losses, while privileges to just one industry at the expense of the rest of the economy will push Ukraine farther behind developed countries. However, this support will not lead to any positive changes in the steelworks sector. Steel oligarchs already evade taxes and report fake losses by re-selling their products to their own offshore companies at knockdown prices, which is where their profits remain. Meanwhile, they view the domestic steel industry as a milk cow that helps them generate billions in offshore zones, with which they later buy assets in Ukraine for peanuts. For instance, Rinat Akhmetov just bought 93% of UkrTelecom's shares from the Austrian company EPIC (many experts actually believed that Akhmetov's entities stood behind this company back in 2011 when it bought the state-owned fixed line telephone monopoly for UAH 10.5bn). The current Chairman of the State Property Fund said that the latest deal may again be worth UAH 10bn. In other words, oligarchs can afford to amass assets, but have no money to upgrade their loss-generating steelworks, from which they apparently laundered the money for the new assets in the first place.

The deal with UkrTelecom proves once again that oligarchs have been pretending to do business for the past two decades. In fact, they have merely been redistributing the assets that Ukraine inherited from the USSR without creating anything new or investing into innovations. It looks like the next battle will be for Kryvorizhstal. The PR campaign started with Shuster Live, the most popular political talk show in Ukraine, which covered mass lay-offs at the plant as its top story, thus leading to the conclusion that it is time to take Kryvorizhstal from a bad owner and give it to a good one. The name of the potential good owner surfaced recently, although his trace was visible from the very beginning. The Commercial Court of Kyiv resumed the case to deem the privatization of 93% of Kryvorizhstal illegal, based on the claim of IMC (Investment-Metallurgy Union) established by Rinat Akhmetov's SCM and Viktor Pinchuk's Interpipe. In 2005, Tymoshenko's Cabinet took the plant away from them. That same year, the repeated privatization of Kryvorizhstal through a public tender turned out to be the most successful one since Ukraine regained independence: Mittal Steel acquired it for USD 4.8bn, a record-breaking sum for the Ukrainian budget. The tender was held after the court ruled that the first privatization of Kryvorizhstal was illegal: in 2004, it was sold to the IMC for USD 0.8bn.

Overall, Ukraine's GDP per capita confirms that Ukrainian oligarchs only pretend to do business: it has barely changed over the past 20 years here, while multiplying in countries, such as Poland that have implemented structural reforms. ■



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Oliver Bullough: “There will now be much fewer Russians than we used to have in the world”

A British Russophile shares his views on the spiritual roots of the demographic tragedy affecting the Russian nation

Interviewer:
Bohdan
Tsiupyn, UK

This nation is still experiencing the “totalitarian experiment”; it’s sick; it’s tiling nation is dying out. This is Oliver Bullough’s latest book *The Last Man in Russia and the struggle to save a dying nation* published in April. This is not the work of a Russophobe gloating over the agony of a nation in decline. On the contrary, Bullough is a Western Russophile with an Oxford education who spent years living in and exploring Russia. Having worked in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the young British writer witnessed events that would likely traumatize the average European. When the USSR announced that it was building a paradise on Earth in the 1960s, the Russian population began to drink itself to death, the book’s summary states. For a time, vodka was bringing more revenue to the state than oil. People like Oliver are surprised to see that “death by alcoholism” continues in Russia.

High death rates among Russians – mostly men of working age – resulted in a gap of 240,000 in the death to birth rate in 2010. Overall, the population of Russia shrank from 148.5 to 141.9 million between 1991 and 2010. Meanwhile, the structure of the population is changing dramatically as any growth, even if only negative, is primarily the result of immigration from non-Russian republics and higher fertility rates among non-Russian ethnic minorities.

Might China one day assume that the Russians don’t actually need their vast territories in Siberia or the Far East? What will



Russia be like with, say, Muslims accounting for one tenth of its population? Will the Russians manage to stop associating themselves with the Soviet Union and its gravitation toward territory grabbing and domination and begin solving their own problems instead? Oliver Bullough's book is an attempt to answer these questions. In his interview with *The Ukrainian Week*, Bullough explains some of the observations behind his insightful conclusions.



UW: Your book is called *The Last Man in Russia*. In one of the recent discussions in London you said that Russia is doomed. Can you elaborate on that?

I wrote a book about Chechnya and the North Caucasus which have been seen some of the bloodiest episodes in Russian colonialism. Russia and Russian government do not come out of that very well, to put it mildly. It is basically a series of continuous genocides, and no government would come out of that well. A number of my Russian friends who read the book said that they really liked it but thought it a bit unfair to single out only one episode in Russian, while ignoring the fact that unlike a lot of governments – say in the Nazi Germany or imperial Japan – the Russian one always inflicted violence and torment on its own people as much, if not more, than it did on everyone else. The rule of Russian dictatorship was very different from that in any other nations. So, they said that it was unfair to only focus on what Russia had done to non-Russians. That's why I wanted to write a book about ethnic Russians and difficulties they faced. And the most obvious subject to write about in that sense is its demographic disaster.

Russia has a very high death rate at a very low birth rate. This is the Russian cross. There are other countries with high death rates, but they almost always have high birth rates, while countries with low birth rates have long life expectancy. Japan, for example, has a very low birth rate, but people live long there. Congo has low life expectancy but an awful lot of children.

UW: That's what your subtitle says: the struggle to save a dying nation. Is Russia dying?

Yes, it is – the Russian nation in terms of Russian people, ethnic Russians.

There will now be much fewer Russians than we used to have in the world, both in absolute and in relative terms. Their birth rate has been so low for so long that it is effectively impossible to have enough children to bring the number of Russians back to the level that we previ-

BIO

Oliver Bullough studied modern history at Oxford University. After graduation in 1999, he went to Russia and lived in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan for seven years. While in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, he worked as a travelling Reuters reporter. His award-winning first book, *Let Our Fame Be Great*, focuses on the liberation struggle and modern life in the Caucasus, and has achieved critical acclaim in the UK and US. In 2011, Oxfam, an international organization working to find solutions to poverty and related problems, awarded Oliver as a new writer. He is currently working as the Caucasus editor for the Institute of War & Peace Reporting.

ously saw. This will have astonishing consequences in terms of the army in Russia and Russian culture: if the only way Russia maintains its population is through massive sustained immigration, Russian culture will see a radical change.

My book is about the way the government of the Soviet Union attempted to change the Russian nation. And not just Russians – it tried to inflict the same changes on Ukrainians or the Kyrgyz, but the book focuses on the Russians and the government's attempts to change them from a very traditional peasant civilization based on their own traditions essentially unchanged for hundreds of years into a modern proletarian civilization in just one generation. That

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ALWAYS INFLECTED VIOLENCE AND TORMENT ON ITS OWN PEOPLE AS MUCH, IF NOT MORE, THAN IT DID ON EVERYONE ELSE

process, which hit hard Ukraine and other nations of course, was particularly nasty for Russia because it had no foreigners to blame for it. The Georgians, for instance, can say "It's the Russians who did that to us" – they have someone outside to blame. Ukrainians can do the same. The Russians don't have that. The government was theirs, Russian, and that means that they have this permanent conflicted double relationship to what happened to them.


I think, it explains why Stalin is considered a great person in Russia to this day despite of what he did. It is a unique dilemma that no other European nation faces: being both the victim and the perpetrator.

UW: So, many Russians still cannot break with the Soviet communist past because it's part of them?

Yes. I sometimes imagine that it's like if you had run a hundred miles as hard as you could, and sometime told you you'd been running in a wrong direction. There would be a part of you that would try to justify why you'd run that hundred miles. Even if you had run in a wrong direction and it hadn't done you any good at all, you had actually run that distance. The Russians, for instance, make a very big thing out of winning WWII, although they didn't really. They beat the Germans but that didn't mean that they won themselves. Look at what happened to the Soviet army after the war: hundreds of thousands of people were sent off to the GULAGs because they had been captured by the Germans, although that's not their fault. That's not what a country does to a victorious army. There is a sort of belief there that "we did that". I had a colleague in Moscow who said "We own Chelsea" when Roman Abramovich bought it. "You don't own Chelsea," I said. "It's a man who bought the companies that used to belong to the Russian nation for almost nothing and used his vast wealth now to buy something in a foreign country." The Russians don't own that football club. He owns it thanks to the money that used to belong to the Russian nation. It's this strange identification of the Russians with those who oppress them. It's very interesting psychologically.

UW: You have stated that Russia is unique. Why do you think it's different from, say, Great Britain? What stops the British from drinking too much or wallowing in self-pity over their lost empire? Why doesn't the British elite dare to undertake the sort of social experiments that the Russians carried out among their population?

This is the question that goes back to the depth of historical past. I think it also goes back to Russia's geographical nature. Britain is an island and we've always been a sea fare nation. That meant that we would inevitably become a trading nation and get rich in a certain way. The fact



that Russia was a land empire with no strong countries to the east helped it become an empire in a different way. Being an empire for Britain, France or any other nation scars the country. That causes problems at home for the empire-making country. The British Empire has longer been gone now, so Britain has dealt with it in a way although it took it a long time – decades probably – to get used to the fact that it no longer has the presence that significant in the world. Russia as an empire fell apart relatively recently, and it did in a weird way, accidentally almost in 1991. Because of that a lot of Russians haven't come to terms with the fact that they are no longer a world power and as significant as they used to be. Now, they are the country of the level of Britain or Germany, not the US or China. That is something that takes long to get used to. It is even more difficult – and I don't mean to make too much of a caricature out of it – given that that was all Russia had. In Britain, for instance, we have other things to be proud of, such as

having a democracy and being rich. Russia is neither very rich nor a democracy. So, being an empire was its identity. When the empire is lost, it's obviously going to hurt. It's difficult. Why the Russians drink an awful lot? There are other questions that accompany this one. All countries in Northern Europe always had heavy alcohol consumption – look at the Finns or the Swedes. I don't really know the reason for that. But it's particularly visible in Russia: the combination of oppressive political culture and drinking as part of the national culture has actually been a disaster.

UW: You mentioned Ukraine and Ukrainians in your book, mostly with respect to GULAGs. But let's talk about the modern aspect. There's a popular saying among Ukrainians: Russian intellectuals and liberals cease to be freedom-lovers when it comes to Ukraine. Zbigniew Brzezinski said that when Russia loses its control over Ukraine, it will no longer be an empire, but a normal nation focused on the well-being and life of its own people. Would you agree that the Ukrainian issue is that important for the future of Russia as a nation?

I don't know. I didn't spend a lot of time in Ukraine. I was there for the Orange Revolution, and a few times later. I think Russians struggle with Ukraine in the same way as a lot of English people struggle with Ireland. I'm from Wales so I'm looking at this as a third party. If you mention the crimes of the British Empire, a lot of English people would try to defend it in a way they would never defend its crimes in Kenya or India. I also think that part of it is that many British people feel that the Irish aren't actually foreigners; they are British. In the same way, the Russians can't deal with the fact that Ukrainians are not Russians. To them, Ukrainians are so evidently Russian but they are either paid to say they are not, or they are stupid. In fact, a lot of Russian politicians have this sort of an opinion that the only reason you have to disagree with them is that you're either a traitor or stupid. This has very deep roots in their political culture. And that's

The combination of oppressive political culture and drinking as part of the national culture has actually been a disaster

When Putin's generation is moved aside and the new one comes, the latter is going to face the most appalling legacy, and dealing with it will be an incredibly difficult task for them

what they find frustrating about Ukraine – that Ukrainians do not seem to appreciate the fact that Russia is the best friend, the big brother, and that Ukraine should just get along with everything Russia says. The fact that Ukraine might prefer to make friends with Poland seems insane to Russians.

UW: You lived in Russia for years. Do you sense any change in that attitude over that time? Do you think the Russians' attitude toward Ukraine is changing for the better or is it getting worse? I've heard, for instance, that Russia's new opposition leader Alexei Navalny is essentially a Russian chauvinist and imperialist, especially when it comes to Ukraine.

I haven't noticed changes for better or for worse. I think it goes up and down depending on politics in Kyiv. When Yushchenko was in power, he talked a lot about the 1932-33 Holodomor and that makes the Russians incredibly angry. They are not good in admitting that it happened in the first place, and they refuse to admit that it was genocide. When Ukrainian politicians discuss that, it makes the Russians very angry, I think, in terms of their political stance. At the moment, the Ukrainian government doesn't talk about it so much. This means that the Russians can sort of stop thinking about that. But it hasn't gone away.

The Russians haven't really come to terms with what was done in their name. In the same way, a lot of British people haven't come to terms in what was done in our name. Although that wasn't perhaps quite as horrible. It's the same with Chechnya. When you talk about what was done to the Chechens and the deportations in, say, 1944, even to the nicest Russian, you face total disconnect – a refusal to admit that that was a crime. I think it's the same with Holodomor. When it comes to that, you hear in Moscow that, if it did happen, it wasn't only Ukrainians in it, and they should have shut up about it a long time ago anyway. It's very similar to how the Turks talk about Armenians.

UW: Isn't this refusal to comprehend what was done in the

name of Moscow and the Soviet Union a root of the Russian tragedy?

I can see it this way if you're coming from a Ukrainian perspective. But inside Russia, what was done in terms of its foreign policy – outside of Russia – is relatively unimportant for the Russians. What was done inside Russia was much more important. My book is about the Russian nation. I focused on what was done inside the country. Of course, what it did outside of its borders was absolutely appalling. If it were a wider book covering the Soviet Union, then it would naturally focus more on the deportation of the Chechens, the Ingush and the other nations; on what was done to the nomads in Kazakhstan. But this was only about the Russians, and I wanted to try and make them the centre of

THE CORRECT VERSION OF THE HOLODOMOR

Russian historians now have yet another series of recommendations on how to address the issue of the 1932-33 forced famine known as the *Holodomor*. Russia's Federal Archive Agency suggests that archival documents be quoted in such a way that the fact of the Holodomor targeting Ukraine is refuted.

In the roundtable "On Preventing the Falsification of History of Nations to Damage the Interests of Russia" held at the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, Deputy Director of the Russian Archive Vladimir Tarasov stated, "the Federal Archive initiated a number of media campaigns regarding the famine in the USSR. This was clearly a response to what happened in Ukraine... to neutralize what had taken place there" [he was apparently referring to the Ukrainian historical discourse of the 1932-33 Holodomor – Ed.]

"Given the Ukrainian 'factor', documents should be compiled in such a way that they prove the universal nature of grain collection in 1932, performed with similar methods in different crisis regions (Ukraine, North Caucasus, Lower Volga)," Viktor Kandrashyn, historian and research advisor of the three-volume compilation of archive documents, wrote in his explanatory note.

The initial title planned for the three-volume compilation was *The 1932-33 Famine in the USSR*. However, Russian officials apparently took the Ukrainian factor into account and altered the timeframe to avoid references to the years of 1932-33 that have become a synonym for the Ukrainian Holodomor. The compilation is now advertised as *The 1929-1934 Famine in the USSR*.

The motivation behind the mass murder of Ukrainian citizens through starvation, as suggested by the authors of the compilation, is as follows: Joseph Stalin did this in order to battle external enemies. "This chapter may include documents on the growing tension in international politics in 1932, particularly in the Far East and Europe. This forced Stalin to take a 'firm stance' in domestic policy".

Kandrashyn also recommends selecting documents about deaths of starvation "without detailed descriptions of cannibalism. Documents should be selected in a way that shows the tragedy of all Soviet peasants, without an emphasis on Ukraine."

their own history. That's why I focused on alcoholism, GULAGs and repressions against the Orthodox church. Also, as the book goes on, it focuses increasingly on anti-Semitism because the Jews were foreigners living inside Russia. In a way, they become a representation of all mi-

THE RUSSIANS HAVEN'T REALLY COME TO TERMS WITH WHAT WAS DONE IN THEIR NAME

norities in the Soviet Union. Anti-Semitism became an increasingly serious movement in Russia in the 1980-1990s. And that's a fairly big part of the book.

UW: Can Russia be saved as a nation? Can it ever be happy with itself?

I take a lot of heart from the protests that have been happening in Russia – not particularly because I want Russia to become a liberal democracy, although I like liberal democracies. But I think that the fact that young Russians are standing up and insisting that they be treated with dignity and respect is a very important and impressive movement. The 2011-2012 protests in Russia had very much in common with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine – when young people insisted that they be treated like citizens, not as subjects. I think that gives hope that the new generation in Russia will not tolerate the kind of abuse that other Russians had to tolerate. But it is coming so late that, whatever happens, the Russian nation will have to be a lot smaller than it is now even if it becomes politically free. This brings forth other problems. I would love to say that Russia has 20 years in which the new generation could grow up and take charge and create a more open and respectful political culture. Sadly, however, it does not have 20 years – it does not have any time at all. When Putin's generation is moved aside, they are going to face the most appalling legacy, and dealing with it will be an incredibly difficult task for them. ■

Help Thy Neig

Why philanthropy is not popular in Ukraine

Author:
Bohdan Butkevych

The Ministry of Justice reports that at the beginning of 2013, Ukraine had over 15,000 officially registered charity organizations and foundations. This is a lot, but quantity does not mean quality. In a 2012 study of private charity development in the world by the Charities Aid Foundation, Ukraine landed 111th, dropping six points from 2011. Sociologists have determined a persistent mistrust and a general lack of understanding of the point of charity in Ukrainian society, especially among people aged over 35. This attitude is made worse by the alert attitude of government authorities to corrupt charity initiatives schemes that they are not involved in and tax pressure. The new Law “On Charity Activities and Charity Organizations” enacted in February 2013 has failed to solve key problems in this sphere.

INERTNESS AND DISTRUST

“Up to 2,000 new charity organizations have emerged in Ukraine annually in the past few years,” says Anna Hulevska-Chernysh, Director of the Ukrainian Forum of Philanthropists. “This surge is not surprising. It coincided with many election campaigns where politicians tried to buy voter support with philanthropy. This is why only 2,000 or 15% of the 15,000 officially registered charities actually work in Ukraine.” According to the Ukrainian Forum of Philanthropists, all EU member-states have 110,000 officially registered charity organizations. Compared to their rate of one charity organization per 4,500 people, Ukraine’s one per 3,000 looks inspiring. However, a

survey conducted in 2012 by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Centre, confirmed that most charities in Ukraine only exist on paper: only 21% of Ukrainians supported them last year, only 6% did so because they trusted them.

The poverty of Ukrainian society is commonly considered to be the main cause of the reluctance to donate to charity. However, welfare is by far not the key factor in philanthropy. International surveys prove that it is much more common and efficient in some countries that are poorer than Ukraine. This attitude stems from the Soviet past, says psychologist Nadia Artysenko. “The Soviet government kept telling people that there were no such things as problems in the USSR. Plus, it fought against the church, where

charity was one of the basic elements, and stifled any private initiative in people, even philanthropic. Add to this the Soviet “preventive” struggle against beggars, and the discouraging experience with many fraudsters begging for money today,” she explains.

CHARITY FRAUD

Based on the above-mentioned survey by the Democratic Initia-

Average
Ukrainians donate
UAH 50
to charity

FIVE STEPS TO AVOID CHARITY FRAUDSTERS

1. Check the official registration of the charity organization or foundation asking for your donation at the Justice Ministry
2. Demand charity organization’s portfolio, i.e. information on earlier campaigns conducted by the organizations, preferably with financial reports on expenditures and the use of the funds they collected
3. If you or your company decides to donate funds to a charity, the best option is to do it via transfer through a reliable bank, preferably an international one
4. Demand a report detailing what the organization is planning to spend the donations on, and a final report, before donating money
5. Remember that the new law on charity passed in February 2013 allows you to demand the reimbursement of your donation if it was misused by the charity



hbour

tives Foundation, the key charity instruments in Ukraine include contributions through charity boxes (43%), the purchase of goods where part of the income is donated to charity (21%), and participation in charity events organized by employers (16%). These are the methods most often used by fraudsters.

Most fraudsters ask for money in public transport. In Kyiv, the subway is the most popular

venue. They normally ask people to help them buy a train ticket home, pay for a surgery for a family member, and the like. Most have some kind of certificate, ostensibly confirming the diagnosis. However, police statistics claims that up to 95% of them are fraudsters.

"Fraudsters went from door to door, telling people that a sick girl needs treatment in Germany," volunteer Oleksiy Savka says of a recent fraud discovered by a Kyiv-based charity organization. "They said that the state wouldn't help the girl, so they had to collect the money

from the public. They were only exposed two months later, but the police refused to charge them. That's the reality. No wonder people often treat charity volunteers like sales agents."

"I once decided to help a sick child," says Oleksandr Troshkin, a manager at an international company in Kyiv. "There was a large plastic box with the baby's photo and a plea to help the parents pay for treatment abroad. Below was a contact number. As I had read about the latest news on charity frauds, I called the number to ask how the baby was doing. No-one answered. I later discovered that this was a scam that brought the people behind it over UAH 200,000. Now, I treat charity organizations with caution."

"Unfortunately, the number of charity fraudsters is growing," says Dmytro Struk, President of




FROM HEART TO HEART: Volunteers have recently organized campaigns in most cities of Ukraine to draw public attention to charity




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the Sertse do Sertsia (Heart to Heart) Foundation. And they have been using new ways to get money. “They call commercial companies and ask for permission to collect money for a charity cause,” Serhiy, an investigator in Kyiv, shares. “Or they propose that companies support a charity event, preferably a one-time one. According to our statistics, up to 40% of all frauds are done this way because it’s fairly easy. If the fraudsters manage to fool the company, the latter collect money from their employees or the company pays for the cause from its budget. The amounts they earn this way are much higher than those they collect on the streets. The risk is higher, of course, but the fraudsters have become skilled in this art, and make authentic-looking fake documents.”

Experts believe that an important step in changing this would be to switch from cash donations to non-cash bank transfers. However, this will not eliminate charity fraud altogether. Serhiy and Oksana Frolov experienced one eighteen months ago when their nine-year old son was diagnosed with thyroid cancer. The couple opened an account at one of the largest banks in Ukraine. “Thanks to our friends who work on TV and helped us air our appeal for help

on many channels, we received a goodly sum,” Serhiy says. “But fraudsters gained access to the account because of staff negligence, or so we were told by bank employees, and stole all the money, nearly USD 5,000.”

THE GREEDY STATE

The new law has made it much easier to register a charity organization or foundation in Ukraine. Even a group of individuals with a founding act and a charter listing their goals and expected sources of income, will almost surely get a registration at the Justice Ministry. At year-end, they are obliged to disclose financial statements, have independent supervisory boards and report to the tax inspection. Experts claim, however, that 90% of all existing charity organizations ignore these requirements.

“There are barely any charity statistics in Ukraine,” claims Anna Hulevska-Chernysh. “On the one hand, the state, represented by the tax authority, is not providing this information. If published, it will reveal that charity is subject to taxation in Ukraine, which is nonsense in most other countries. On the other hand, most charity organizations do not disclose their financial statements. The huge tax pressure urges those willing to donate to do so unofficially, while

companies record their donations to charity as marketing or PR expenses rather than charity expenses which can account for 1-4% of their total budget. Under the current Tax Code, donors have to pay income tax on aid to recipients.” And banks rarely warn people opening a charity account that current legislation does not classify incoming funds as special-purpose funding, thus they are subject to taxation, plus bank fees.

This burden virtually stifles the development of some popular and effective charity technologies that are used all over the world, such as mobile donations. Mobile operators in Ukraine say that any text message, even if it is sent as a charity donation, is subject to a 20% VAT and 7.5% Pension Fund fee. As a result, the recipient gets 45 kopykasy at most from a charity text message costing UAH 1.

In addition to the tax burden, another big problem is the misappropriation of charity funds. In the recent past, state institutions including hospitals, orphanages and social services, would often sell the medicines, humanitarian aid and equipment sent to them as aid. This bitter experience has now taught charity organizations to try to supervise them more closely. As a result, many recipients often refuse to work with donors. Social ser-

THE MOST HELPFUL? Boxes for donations in stores and other public premises are the most popular charity tool in Ukraine. Each one brings in up to UAH 8,000 annually




PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

vinces boycott most private charity initiatives because this blocks the traditional corrupt scams used for embezzling funds allocated for social aid and work. "Our state authorities, with only a few rare exceptions, don't like charity organizations, because they can provoke inspections or turn media attention to the misappropriation of funds, while striking a bargain with charity organizations is more difficult than with inspection authorities, because the former are mostly driven by enthusiasts," says volunteer Andriy Vlasianets. "In fact, whenever it comes to private initiatives, the government immediately sees this as a threat to itself, some sort of politics. Therefore, the best thing would be for government authorities not to interfere, issue all necessary licenses and keep tax inspections to a minimum. Lately, tax authorities have been visiting efficient charity organizations, especially international ones, on a regular basis." ■

The average Ukrainian philanthropist is a woman from a big city in Western Ukraine, aged 33-39

MAJOR SOURCES OF CHARITY IN UKRAINE



Source: December 2012 survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Centre



ALL ROADS LEAD TO MILLE MIGLIA



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The Virus of Rebellion

The 1953 uprising initiated by Ukrainian political prisoners in the Norilsk forced labour camp was the first step towards the downfall of the Gulag

Author:
Ihor
Derevianyi

26 May 2013 marks
the
60th
anniversary of the
Gorlag uprising

As the entire world was rethinking militarist ideologies and returning to the humanist ideas reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 1948), the totalitarian Soviet Union remained quite “exotic” with its Gulag, an infamous system of concentration camps. Moreover, the Soviets had just begun to designate special camps—the so-called *osob-*

lagi (special-purpose camps)—for “especially dangerous state criminals” (see Notes). After the Second World War, this category comprised primarily members of armed resistance forces who had fought against the Soviet regime and were taken captive: OUN underground activists, UPA fighters, Baltic “forest brothers”, members of the Polish Armija Krajowa (Home Army), etc.

LIVING IN SPECIAL-PURPOSE CAMPS

The residential quarters of *osoblagi* were kept under prison-like security: windows had iron bars; barracks were locked up for the night; inmates were not allowed to leave the barracks outside of working hours. The residential space afforded to inmates in 1948 was half the size of that in general-purpose forced labour camps: one square metre per per-



SOURCE: ARCHIVE OF THE CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, LVA

son. Inmates of special-purpose camps were utilized for especially difficult work, including mining and industrial and residential construction. The excesses of camp administration, armed guards and MGB escorts were outrageous and, most importantly, they acted with total impunity. Special-purpose camps were the final and most cynical Stalinist invention in the long history of the Gulag, a system designed to destroy people first morally and then physically.

Convicted criminals were another tool used by the authorities to harass inmates. According to official documents, such convicts (urki, urkagany or blatari in criminal slang) were not supposed to be placed in special-purpose camps, but the authorities intentionally sent groups of them there. Camp administrators turned a blind eye to the abuses of criminals, who bullied political prisoners and established much-desired discipline in the camps. Still, criminals were a minority in the osoblagi, with political prisoners outnumbering them five to one. Camp administration assigned criminals to do lighter work, largely on the territory of the camp and issued them full rations for meeting work quotas. This was done to ensure that the criminals were in good physical condition to fulfil their main task – maintaining discipline and “order” among the prisoners. In this way, camp administrations ignored the typical crimes carried out against political prisoners: theft of private belongings, psychological harassment, physical abuse and sometimes murder.

However, the situation changed after former OUN activists and UPA fighters arrived and took control of the osoblagi. “I do not know about other places (they started killing in all the Special Camps, even the Spask camp for the sick and disabled), but in our camp [in Kengir] it began with the arrival of the Dubovka transport – mainly Western Ukrainians, OUN members,” Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote. “The movement everywhere owed a lot to these people, and indeed it was they who set the wheels in motion. The Dubovka transport brought us the bacillus of rebellion.... These

sturdy young fellows, fresh from the guerrilla trails, looked around themselves in Dubovka, were horrified by the apathy and slavery they saw, and reached for their knives...A law indeed emerged, but it was a new and surprising law: ‘You whose conscience is unclean – this night you die!’ Murders now followed one another in quicker succession than escapes in the best period. They were carried out confidently and anonymously: no one went with a bloodstained knife to give himself up; they saved themselves and their knives for another deed. At their favourite time – [in the early morning] when a single warder was unlocking huts one after another, and while nearly all the prisoners were still sleeping – the masked avengers entered a particular section, went up to a particular bunk, and unhesitatingly killed the traitor, who might be awake and howling in terror or might be still asleep.”

In the early 1950s, the camps were divided into two parts. The inmates had their own order and clearly split the territory between political prisoners and criminals. Outside the camp, the administration continued to function as before. But the situation was becoming increasingly tense: prisoners demanded changes in security, while warders wanted to restore their lost authority. For example, in order to instil order in Peshchlag (Karaganda, Kazakhstan), some 1,200 inmates from Western Ukraine who were imprisoned for anti-Soviet activity were moved to the Gorlag – a mountain mining camp. This contingent became the catalyst for the Norilsk uprising.

UNDER THE BANNER OF FREEDOM

After the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 and with a presentation of amnesty, political prisoners in Soviet camps expected not merely changes but a review of criminal cases and release. Under the “Beria amnesty”, around 1 million of 2.5 million inmates were released, but this did not affect special-purpose camps for political prisoners. Outraged inmates in the Gorlag camp in Norilsk were the first to go on strike in the osoblagi. They raised the

As of 5 June
1953,
as many as six
divisions – a total of

16,379

inmates – were on
strike in the Norilsk
camp

black banner of freedom that later became a symbol for other uprisings in Vorkuta (1953) and Kengir (1954).

In order to “restore order” and on instructions from Gorlag chief General Ivan Semenov, a group of criminals was moved to the 2nd camp division on 21 May 1953. They were armed with knives, and the resulting slaughter left many casualties. However, the political prisoners still refused to end their strike. On 25-26 May, armed guards twice shot at columns of inmates in the 1st, 4th and 5th divisions, killing a few and wounding many more. This is when the Norilsk uprising actually started. A week after its



EVEN THOUGH THE GORLAG UPRISING WAS EVENTUALLY SUPPRESSED BY THE AUTHORITIES, IT PROVIDED THE FIRST GLIMMER OF HOPE AND AN EXAMPLE OF RESISTANCE IN THE VAST GULAG SYSTEM

inception, the uprising had reached a massive scale: six camp divisions – a total of 16,379 inmates – were on strike as of 5 June. It lasted from the end of May until early August 1953.

The resistance was strictly organized: inmates formed “committees” which acted openly and regulated the duties of strikers. One person in each barrack was

NOTES

Osoblagi (from Russian “special-purpose camps”) were special concentration camps in the Gulag system designed to isolate political opponents that posed the greatest danger to the Soviet regime. They operated from 1948-54 and differed from general-purpose forced labour camps in their strict prison-like security and their assignment of inmates to especially difficult work in construction, mining industry, etc. A total of 12 special camps were set up in the USSR with a combined capacity of 275,000 inmates. The largest were Rechlag in Vorkuta, Ozerlag in Taishet, Berlag (popularly known as Kolyma) in Magadan, Steplag in Jezkazgan and Gorlag in Norilsk.

Gorlag (from Russian “mountain camp”; also known as “special camp No. 2”) was a special-purpose concentration camp that replaced the Norilsk Forced Labour Camp on 28 February 1948. It operated until 25 June 1954. Its inmates worked in ore mining quarries, coal mines, road construction and the Norilsk Copper Smelting Plant. As of 1 January 1953, there were 20,167 inmates in the camp. MGB Major General Ivan Semenov became chief of the Gorlag camp in 1952.

Camp cemetery in Minlag. Unnamed inmates are buried beneath the plaques



SOURCE: ARCHIVE OF THE CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, LVIV

designated to lead the protests. These leaders made up department committees, up to 20 people in each. However, Soviet investigators found in 1956 that there were also secret groups of real organizers and leaders who were never identified. The committees were formed several days after the uprising started as a necessary form of organization. However, they acted following a clear, pre-determined plan, which led investigators to believe that they were implementing the decisions of a secret group.

Insurgents from different divisions coordinated their actions, passing information through trustworthy people, as

was previously done in the OUN underground. The majority of inmates were informed about forthcoming events via leaflets. They braced for possible attacks by equipping themselves with handmade knives and clubs. Camp administration and the Soviet Interior Ministry tried to use various means (some extraordinary) to quell the uprising. Their main goal was to move the inmates out of the barracks, split them into smaller groups of 100 people each and then capture active insurgents and organizers. To this end, warders armed with clubs were sent to enter the prison territory and make arrests.



Mykhailo Soroka (1911-71), a leader of the Kengir uprising in May-June 1954, became a symbol of enduring strength for political prisoners



Ukrainian political prisoners at work in a stone quarry, Norilsk

SOURCE: ARCHIVE OF THE CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, LVIV

However, these attempts were thwarted by the self-defence units that inmates had formed. In order to break their resistance, camp administrators decided to resort to the field-tested practice of using groups of armed criminals. However, the rebels foresaw this move and successfully repelled the attack. According to eyewitness accounts, the criminals fled shouting to the armed guards for help: "Save us! The Banderites are killing us!"

The strike persisted, and confused party functionaries resorted to unprecedented measures: for the first time in decades they made concessions to the rebels and set up a special Interior Ministry commission headed by Colonel Mikhail Kuznetsov which came from Moscow to Norilsk on 5 June. The commission had the task of ending the strike at any cost. The camp administration arranged for a radio broadcast of the address from the commission chief intended to calm the inmates and normalize the situation. Kuznetsov assured the rebels that their demands (review of cases, cutting prison terms, cancelling special security, etc.) would be taken to the leadership of the USSR for discussion and action. Some inmates fell for the promises: rebels in the 1st division of the Gorlag reported their leaders to the administration and ended the strike.

The commission met some of the strikers' demands regarding camp security measures and, at the same time, prepared to crush the uprising. As of early August, the uprising in the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th divisions had ended.

PACIFICATION WITH CONSEQUENCES

The uprising was suppressed using different measures. One was the show of force: the Gorlag administration expanded the so-called "off-limits zone" to intimidate inmates – armed guards could shoot to kill any inmates, including strikers, who crossed the line.

Some unique measures were also employed to quell the uprising: water cannons were used in the 6th division where women were kept, and firearms in the 1st division of the Gorlag. In the 6th division, the administration used



SOURCE: ARCHIVE OF THE CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, LVM



UPA Colonel Vasyl Levkovich, commander of the Buh unit, at work in a Dubravlag camp, Mordovia, 1963. He served 25 years starting from 1946.

fire trucks to disperse the inmates by shooting them with jets of water. Then, guards entered the territory of the camp and isolated the organizers of the strike. In the 1st division of the Gorlag, MGB troops opened fire and succeeded in capturing the camp,

killing 11 inmates, seriously wounding 14 (of which 12 later died) and lightly wounding 22 more. The 3rd division held out the longest. On 4 August 1953, troops from the 4th division of military unit 7580 broke into the camp's territory and fired upon

the strikers. According to official sources, 4 were killed and 14 wounded. The unofficial count was up to 150 dead.

Even though the Gorlag uprising was eventually suppressed by the authorities, it provided the first glimmer of hope and an example of resistance in the vast Gulag system. The Norilsk events spread the virus of rebellion across the entire system. Cheka reports on the Norilsk special camp dated 17 July 1953 contain information on the suppression of uprisings in the 5th, 6th, 13th and 35th divisions. Later, a wave of large uprisings swept across the Rechlag (July 1953), Kurgansk, Unzha and Viatka camps (January 1954). Another erupted in Bodaybo in February 1954. The largest one occurred in Steplag in May-June 1954. They all ended like the Norilsk uprising but still succeeded in triggering the irreversible downfall of the Gulag system and led to its ultimate liquidation in 1960. ■

TESTIMONIES ABOUT THE NORILSK UPRISING



Ivan Hubka: "It happened on 26 May 1953 when Diatlov, who escorted guards to the production zone in a brick plant where female inmates from division No. 6 worked, began

shooting from a submachine gun at prisoners in male division No. 5. Seven of them were wounded: Klymchuk (who later died of his wounds), Medvedev, Korzhev, Nadeiko, Uvarov, Yurkevych and Kuznetsov. A submachine gun burst directed at innocent people was the last straw. At some point, without any thought of the consequences, the oppressed raises his head and declares that he is also a human being and defends his rights to life.

...The tragedy of shooting innocent inmates was framed by the administration as an accident: the escort allegedly shot at the ground, but the bullets ricocheted off of the permafrost. But it didn't matter. The shooting was a fact, and the inmates decided to have their say. Concentration camps had no history of strikes [or uprisings] until then, because strikers would have been shot to death on the spot. (I mean in the times of Lenin and Stalin.) But here the camp administration was at a loss."



Yevhen Hrytsiak: "Indeed, our spontaneous outrage turned into a well-organized protest. The Gorlag administration was suddenly quiet. No one was shooting or

even threatening us. But they decided to break us by famine. They did not deliver food to Gorstroi for days on end. In the morning of the third day, we were approached by Major General Paniukov, escorted by Lieutenant Colonel Sarychev and several senior officers. Paniukov had flown there from Kranoyarsk specifically to address this issue. Speaking in an authoritative and self-assured tone, he demanded that we resume work and promised to investigate any violations that had taken place. We refused and said we would resume work only if a government commission comes from Moscow to Norilsk... We understood that the Gulag would not tolerate this situation and would take severe measures against us. We were ready for anything, but we were not yielding our positions."

Excerpt from a report by Mikhail Kuznetsov, chief of the Prison Department in the USSR

Interior Ministry, to Deputy Interior Minister Ivan Serov:

"In late May, inmates kept in the special Gorlag camp learned about the fact that inmates from the general-purpose camps in Norilsk had begun to be released and transported by steamships under the Amnestsy Decree. Some Ukrainian nationalists among them began to express their sentiments and started talking about extending the amnesty to prisoners in special camps... Later, some OUN members in the 4th and 5th divisions of the Gorlag camp provoked a large group of inmates into disobedience. They refused to come to work and then refused to eat...

Acting through our agents, we have identified the instigators of the unrest. In particular, the most active organizer is inmate Pavlyshyn, b. 1907, a Ukrainian with a teacher's diploma from Prague University, who was convicted of high treason and organized struggle against the Soviet authorities and sentenced to 25 years. His accomplice was inmate Omelianiuk, b. 1922, a Ukrainian convicted for high treason and sentenced to 10 years. Successful measures have been taken to remove Omelianiuk from among the inmates...

Some of the Russian inmates are inclined to punish the Ukrainians who initiated the unrest. As of 3 June of this year, Ukrainian nationalists in camp divisions continue to refuse to come to work. Internal order is being strictly maintained."

Liudmyla Monastyrska:

“I would like to promote Ukrainian classical music abroad”

This spring, the Royal Opera House staged a production of Verdi's *Nabucco*, with the acclaimed Leo Nucci and living legend Plácido Domingo taking turns in the lead role as baritones. This staging of *Nabucco* was especially important for Ukrainians because two Ukrainian singers performed alongside the renowned legends. Vitaliy Kovaliov who began his opera career abroad sang the bass role and Liudmyla Monastyrska sang the soprano. In recent years, she has been welcomed by several world-renowned stages, such as the Deutsche Oper, La Scala and the Metropolitan Opera.

Yet she remains close to her native Ukraine. Liudmyla Monastyrska still sings Ukrainian folk songs in her dressing room. To her, they are the best warm-up, although Western singers do not share her passion and advise her to “be careful with her voice”.

On the stage, she switches to Italian. All seats are sold out. The British dress code for opera venues is casual and smart. After the concert, the audience thanks the artists with a generous round of applause and “bravos”—the emotional standing ovations that usually follow performances in Ukraine are a rarity in Britain.

Nabucco, co-produced by the Royal Opera House and La Scala, is minimalist and timeless. In terms of vocal performance, the cast is perfect—from the statuesque and lively choirs to the masterful Nucci, able to speak volumes with a single gesture. Clad in a simple black coat, Monastyrska in the role of Abigaille is the

embodiment of power. Her spinto floats easily over orchestra tutti and vocal ensembles without muffling them. *Anch'io dischiuso un giorno*, an aria in the second act, performed in a tender piano reiterates all of Abigaille's pain as she holds a torch and watches the clothes of the Hebrews executed upon her order burn on stage.

The next day, I meet with Liudmyla backstage at Covent Garden. “I always leave the stage happy when I have colleagues like these and such a welcoming audience”, she says. I recollect Leo Nucci giving her a warm sincere hug after the performance. “It is important to have a reliable partner on stage, especially in

Author:
Roman Horbyk,
London

pieces as difficult as this one,” she shares. “Although he's not young, Nucci is reliable. He's a fantastic person: nice, polite and, like all Italians, he appreciates a good voice and talent. He never treated me like he was a *grande persona* and I was a young nobody. If he likes something or respects someone, he always says so. Unfortunately, things are often different with my compatriots.”

Still, Liudmyla is always happy to sing with Ukrainians abroad. She recently sang in *Attila* with Vitaliy Bilyi in Santiago and is now working with Vitaliy Kovaliov in *Nabucco*. “I feel very privileged to be able to promote



Ukrainian culture,” she comments. “It inspires me. Moreover, my mother is a linguist so I’m interested in anything related to Ukrainian songs, poetry, traditions and roots, especially from Western Ukraine.”

“Mykola Lysenko’s *Taras Bulba* in Covent Garden – why not? Nothing is impossible. Especially now, with new ideas, a new contemporary vision, and a new generation of talented directors.” However, Western artists have shown little interest in Ukrainian classical music so far, Liudmyla notes. “I would eagerly promote Ukrainian classical music abroad if my Western colleagues were interested in it. Of course, if there were any opportunities at all, I would support any initiatives. More people should represent our country abroad and show its roots, culture and unique melodies.”

CHALLENGING ROLES

“I take all criticism seriously,” Liudmyla says. “Learning and improving should be a lifelong endeavour. No one can sing perfectly—not even the greatest masters”.

Liudmyla Monastyrskaya is known for singing the works of

Verdi, but every singer strives to add versatility to his or her repertoire. Opera connoisseurs look forward to hearing Liudmyla’s powerful voice in Wagner’s operas, while she prefers to move to the bel canto of early Romanticism rather than the late Romantic era.

“I would rather sing Bellini, not Wagner or Richard Strauss,” she comments. “I have an offer to sing Norma. It’s another level

PERFORMERS PROCESS THEIR ROLES THROUGH THEMSELVES, ADD THEIR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES, AND IMPROVE WITH EVERY NEW PERFORMANCE

for me and I would like to reach it. Overall, I love difficult roles – Lady Macbeth, Odabella, all of the early Verdi. As a professional, I find them interesting and challenging: can I master them or not? Actually, learning something new is not a problem. But given some technical issues, I would stick to Verdi for a little longer... Verdi, Verdi, and Verdi again! Apart from that, singing Wagner requires very good German. We have no right to cheat on that.”

American agents have offered Liudmyla mezzo-soprano roles. They should not be a problem for her surprisingly wide and even range and dark timbre. But she is not excited about the idea: “I’m not going to switch to mezzo-soprano as long as I have so many soprano roles I haven’t sung yet. I do, however, find mezzo-soprano roles extremely interesting. The role of Amneris in *Aida* is so dramatic that I think it’s more interesting than the role of *Aida*. And it would definitely be more interesting for me as a woman. Conservatories and auditions always use Amneris’ trial scene from Act 3 for mezzo-sopranos.”

“I LOVE TO SING THE ROLES OF POWERFUL WOMEN”

Liudmyla Monastyrskaya’s path to a brilliant career was not always smooth. Once, she had a hard time getting a role in Ukraine. “In early 2002, the National Op-

era House of Ukraine did not extend my contract although I had been singing solo there since 1998. Perhaps this was because I had young children and the opera house administration thought I wasn’t ready to go on stage and sing, especially difficult roles.” Today, Liudmyla continues to work with the National Opera House of Ukraine, so Ukrainians have a chance to see and hear her on a regular basis.

The Kyiv stage reveals her acting talent. “We work with directors, they give us tips; they see us better than we see ourselves, so they can somehow fit what they see to our singing and vocals. This requires an individual approach for each singer: everyone has his or her own psychophysics and self-perception. A lot depends on the singer’s life experience. Directors are not in control of everything. Performers process their roles through themselves, add their personal experiences, and improve with every new performance. A role can never be played the same way twice. Actually, it’s good for singers to listen to and watch recordings of their performances. This helps them improve their techniques and work on their role. We can’t step back and look at ourselves from afar. I even watch my concerts on the Internet to see what I have to do differently and what I shouldn’t do at all. When you’re on the stage, carried away with emotions and music, you don’t notice gestures or movements that don’t fit”.

“Lately, I have been singing the roles of powerful women. But they all eventually go through repentance or a catharsis of sorts. They are not just criminals who do not deserve forgiveness. All these women – Lady Macbeth, Abigail, Odabella – are strong, but there is still light at the end of the tunnel for them. The singer’s personality is extremely important in opera. A weak person would never make it in this business”.

Liudmyla’s schedule is full for the next two years with *I due Foscari* (The Two Foscari), *Attila*, *Tosca*, *Un ballo in maschera* (A Masked Ball) and *Aida* in the UK, Italy, USA and Germany. ■

PHOTO: ROH / CATHERINE ASHMORE

The Wrong Triangle

On May 30, a *Eastalgia* directed by Daria Onyshchenko premiered in Ukraine. At first sight, it is a well-made project involving international co-production, cooperation with funds, a good title, an important theme and a well-known cast. The film focuses on a burning issue in Ukraine: the massive migration to the West in search of better earnings and these people's nostalgia for their homeland. The director's choice of a modern problem makes sense: finally, the audience will see something about Ukraine today rather than its distant past. The film incorporates three novels set in Germany, Serbia and Ukraine. Shot with a hand camera, they cover the most interesting aspect of human life – love. And they are all intertwined. In one, a 23-year old Ukrai-

nian boy is about to go to his mother in Germany. In the other, his mother is waiting for him. Everything seems to have been done just right. But the dull poster with no accents or attractiveness was the first disappointment. So was the dramatic aspect of the film which was promoted as a social drama. The Ukrainian and Serbian novels

do not seem to be very interesting, and the Ukrainian language spoken by the actors sounds fake. The German part has everything that fully draws the viewer into the drama of the characters, their solitude and pain. Nina Nizheradze who plays the lead female role in the German novel acts brilliantly. With the tiny apartment as her setting, she makes the acting dramatic and versatile with mimicry, gestures and body plastics, without running around too much or showing explosions of emotion. Talented Austrian actor Karl Markovics helps her create the necessary atmosphere. Their tandem is equal: they naturally portray a relationship of two different nations living in a strange world far from home. It is this tandem that makes it worth watching *Eastalgia* and counting it as a success of Ukrainian cinematography. The film has already taken part in many festivals and won an award in Germany.



Events

15 June, 7 p.m.

Blackmore's Night
Palats Sportu
(1, Sportyvna Ploshcha, Kyiv)

The original and sophisticated music of the British folk-rock band will thrill the most demanding audience. The duo of Ritchie Blackmore on acoustic and electric guitar, and Candice Night as lead vocalist, lyricist and multi-instrumentalist, it plays exquisite harmonies that hearken back to the romantic Medieval and Renaissance eras, with musketeers, beautiful ladies and all-night ballroom dancing. When British guitarist and songwriter Ritchie Blackmore started the band, he said:

"I love that period – it's simpler and nobler, more romantic and enchanting than it is now." The band performs in medieval costumes and encourages all fans to dress so for the concerts.



18 June, 7 p.m.

Dialogue
Ukrayina Palace of Arts
(103, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)

This will be the night of Denys Matvienko's ballet dialogue with the audience. The owner of four Grand Prix awards from the most prestigious ballet competitions in the world, he will dance at the Palace of Arts to show his gratitude to the viewers for their love and support. Other solo dancers of the National Opera House of Ukraine will perform on stage alongside Denys, including his wife Anastasia and Nina Ananishvili. The show will include the popular and most requested *Radio and Juliet*, a modern ballet to music by Radiohead.

21 - 23 June

2013 Leopold Grand Prix
All over the city
(Lviv)

Ukraine's art capital churns out one pleasant surprise after another. Shortly after the series of huge rock and jazz festivals, it will host an international festival of retro cars. For several years now, the lovers of old cars have been trying to recreate the Grand Prix race that took place in Lviv eighty years ago. The retro cars will drive through the Lviv Triangle, a historical road in the heart of the old city, between the streets of Vitovskyy, Stryiska and Hvardiyska.

In addition to the race, the programme includes a car festival for kids and a navigation quest.



A New Look at the Old

Something in the Air by French director Olivier Assayas is about France in 1971 and the local youth, showing how social sentiments changed after May of 1968 – the French title of the film, *Après mai*, actually translates as ‘after May’. The echo of revolution remained because the rich and poor did not disappear, but the exhilaration of radical leftist ideas faded like a headache after a party where the drink flowed. In this film, Assayas does not lie or idealize about anything: he paints – literally and metaphorically. It is not so much a tribute to that time, as it is to his personal past, the ideals of his youth, and his beliefs that changed along with his life. It looks like a retrospective of the 1970s, where events are related to certain people and serve as a general conclusion of sorts. Gilles, the main character, is an average young man of that time, carried away by revolutionary turmoil, protesting against the police regime, loving women, weed and films. This is a typical set of hobbies for his age. But his young adulthood passes, leaving him with the following questions: where will you go and will you ever grow up? Unlike *The Dreamers* by Bernardo Bertolucci where the 1968 turmoil went hand in hand with the hero’s new sexual and philosophical experiences – a step-brother of *Something in the Air* – the latter is not all that dreamy. Assayas makes his film clear, linear and unemotional, yet it has its very noticeable atmosphere. And it is deeper than *The Dreamers*. The hero in *Something in the Air* goes through

spiritual and mental trials. At some point, he realizes that he would like to act in movies. However, the pro-communist films of the older generation make him think that their cinematography is boring, and the politics primitive. Despite the fact that the events took place 40 years ago, *Something in the Air* is very modern. Whether he wanted this or not, Assayas showed the evolution of ideas that are virtually identical at all times, where people spark with an idea, and act quickly and skillfully to implement it, talking about it before and after, but actually doing something in the process. This vision may serve the youth and politicians of today well: if you want to do something, do it, don’t just talk about it.



27 June, 10 a.m.

**2013 Trypillian Circle.
Water**
Rzhyschiv
(Kyiv Oblast)

2013 marks the 120th anniversary of the discovery of the Trypillian culture by archeologist Vikentiy Khvoika. Therefore, the 6th international arts festival, Trypilske Kolo, or Trypillian Circle, will be special. Just as in previous years, this year’s programme includes performances by folk groups, book readings, mystical theater performances, folk dance workshops, and much more. As always, the festival area is tobacco, alcohol and drug-free.

The drive to Rzhyschiv will take you around 1.5 hours, but plenty of public buses are available at the Podil bus station to take you there.



28 – 30 June

2013 Lviv on a Platter
All over the city
(Lviv)

Gourmets, as well as anyone who likes good food, will have the opportunity to taste the versatile Lviv cuisine at the 2nd food festival. It will kick off with a huge gala dinner, just like it did last year. In 2012, the common dinner took place in the yard of the Potocki Palace, where almost 300 guests tasted the delicacies. The festival continued with a fair where Lviv restaurants and coffee shops presented their food to everyone in town. And there was plenty of music. This year, the organizers promise an equally intense programme and more mouth-watering surprises.

29 June, 7 p.m.

Depeche Mode
NSK Olimpiyskyi
55, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska,
Kyiv

The legendary British electronic-rock band will play a long-awaited concert in Ukraine as part of its Depeche Mode World Tour 2013. Ukrainian fans are eagerly anticipating listening to what critics have already described as powerful, dark, gloomy and bluesy. The musicians spent all year in the studio, working on their new, thirteenth album. Very soon now, the audience will hear *Delta Machine* – the title was a long-kept secret – live. The first single on the album called *Heaven* was released on February 1, 2013. This time, Depeche Mode plans to visit 25 countries and wrap up the European part of the tour on July 29, in Minsk, Belarus.



The Donbas of Halychyna

A town of two names and two worlds

Author:
Oleksandr Syrtsov

In the early 1950s, the USSR and the People's Republic of Poland swapped territories and populations one last time. As a result, Nyzhnio-Ustritskyi or Lower Ustriky county, previously part of Drohobych Oblast in Ukraine and now known as Ustrzyki Dolne county in Poland, was annexed to Poland. Meanwhile, Lviv Oblast was given the historic towns of Belz, Uhniv and Krystynopol, where coal deposits were later discovered. Thus, the city of Krystynopol, later renamed Chervonohrad, became the county seat of what is now Sokal County in Lviv Oblast. Due to its unique history, the city represents a union of disparate traditions that sets it apart from other towns of the region. Chervonohrad is simultaneously a proletarian mining centre and a historic Halychyna town replete with architectural and religious monuments. In the 1990s, the majority of the town's residents opposed a referendum to revert to the name Krystynopol, yet this remains a contentious issue and the name is still used alongside Chervonohrad in many instances.

HOW TO GET THERE

Kyiv-Lviv train #141 arrives at Chervonohrad at 4p.m. Another option is to take a route bus (marshrutka) from Lviv to Chervonohrad or Sokal. The buses leave Bus Station #2 every 10-15 minutes. Lviv-Sokal or Lviv-Kovel local trains will also take you to Chervonohrad from Lviv.

ARISEN FROM THE ASHES

Chervonohrad is a fairly young town compared to other towns in Halychyna. Grand Hetman of the Crown Feliks Kazimierz Potocki founded it in 1692 and named it after his wife, Krystyna. His grandson Franz Potocki built the palace that remains the town's main attraction despite its turbulent past. Known as the "little Versailles", it was built in accordance with the day's standards of palace architecture. Unfortunately, the postwar years were more traumatic for this residence than for the royal family's other former palaces. In Soviet times, it served purely utilitarian purposes. It did not fit the proletarian spirit of the town, and the palace was soon stripped of its adjacent territories. A school emerged where the gate once stood and a stadium replaced the palace garden. The palace itself was turned into an art school.

In the late 1980s, it hosted the Chervonohrad branch of the Lviv Museum of Religious History, and was almost completely destroyed by a fire. The renovations continue to this day, with staff fixing everything from the roof to the plumbing. Now the building has almost been returned to its former glory. Despite its provincial status, the museum hosts a unique collection of 15-18th cen-

tury icons and attire and a huge collection of 17-18th century books and archives – a total of 10,000 items with their own team of conservators. In addition, the palace serves as Chervonohrad's unofficial ethnographic museum, while also telling the story of the Potocki family.

The adjacent stadium hosts international speedway championships, and the locals have developed a penchant for motorcycle racing. Kayaking is another favourite sport here. International teams begin their journey at Staryi Dobrotvir and navigate the many rapids and whirlpools of the Western Buh River and its tributaries to cross the Ukrainian border and finish their trip in Hrubieszów County in Poland. Their path includes the only river border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish frontier created specifically for athletes.

CHERVONOHRAD'S COAL MINING TRADITIONS

Of the 80,000 residents of Chervonohrad and its satellites, Hirnyk and Sosnivka, 10,000 are working miners. Named for the patron saint of miners, St. Varvara's Day (December 17) is an important day in Chervonohrad. According to Father Oleh, the priest at the local St. Varvara

Church, sermons in the miners' church are nearly identical to those in other churches, but they more often focus on health and protection from incidents in the mines. The miners don't have any special traditions for the day of their patron saint. They quietly flock to the church that stands beside the Grieving Mother, a monument to those who have perished in the mines.

While the mining technologies used in Chervonohrad and Donetsk are similar, I wonder how the miners themselves differ between these two cities. Olena Shovkova, a local historian and art expert, claims that the difference is actually quite stark. She noticed it when miners from the Donbas region came to Chervonohrad as election observers during the Orange Revolution. Here, they found a mining town with a different lifestyle from their own. In addition, the mines in Halychyna are considered safer than those in the Donbas. Perhaps this is because Chervonohrad's mines pay more attention to safety measures. After all, despite its many social problems, Chervonohrad has not had to deal with the issue of *kopanky*—small, shoddy mining operations with low safety standards (see **Digging for Billions at ukrainianweek.com**). Actually, the town's biggest problem is the mines' uncertain future. Some of them have already shut down, and others will soon follow.

"People tend to underestimate miners. Hard physical work breaks the weak, while the strong rise and are encouraged to de-



The Potocki's Palace also known as the Krystynopol Palace now hosts the Museum of Religious History

KEY SITES

St. Volodymyr's Church, formerly the Church of the Advent of the Holy Spirit, is the oldest building in Chervonohrad. Erected in 1692 in the Baroque style, the church still has frescoes from the 18th century.

St. Yuriy's (St. George) Monastery was founded in 1763, shut down in 1946, and restored in 1990 after Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests returned to it.

World War II-era defence structures are located near the Tartakiv village on the outskirts of Chervonohrad. Those interested in war history can see the remains of Soviet defence structures as well as bunkers from the Second World War.

The palace in Tartakiv was another residence of the Potocki family. In the 19th century, the village landlord Zbigniew Lianzkoronski built a palace on the remains of the residence. In 2010, the Lviv Oblast State Administration leased it to a private owner for 49 years on the condition that he must renovate it.

velop," Olena says of her compatriots. There are many talented people among the miners. "You will find these special people even among the average workers, and especially among the engineers working in the mines," she says.

Chervonohrad is a unique fusion of disparate elements: pre-war history and culture reborn from the ashes, a uniquely Halychyna-Ukrainian environment, the special nature of a mining town, and traditions brought by people of different ethnic backgrounds who settled here to work in the Lviv-Volyn coal basin. There is no place quite like it anywhere else in Halychyna. ■

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